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Abstract
Based on a theoretical model, this paper shows that foreign reserves are useful
for a country to enhance the resilience of its domestic economy against balance
sheet effects in the context of external financing strains. Using foreign reserves,
the government can either lend in foreign currency to the private sector or conduct
expenditure-switching policy to increase fiscal spending on domestic goods. Both
policies cam remove the bad equilibrium represented by a large depreciation of
the domestic currency and a very low level of investment. Nevertheless, these two
policy tools differ in the ways they stabilize the domestic economy and in terms
of the minimum required amount of foreign reserves. A targeted lending works by
altering investors’ expectation on domestic exchange rate and firms’ net worth. As
long as foreign reserves are sufficient to cover the private sector’s external debt, the
bad equilibrium is removed even without an actual depletion of reserves. On the
contrary, fiscal spending increases the demand for domestic goods and affects the
relative price, leading to domestic exchange rate appreciation that increases firms’
net worth and facilitates investment.
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1 Introduction
The global economic turmoil, which had started with a local crisis in 2007 in the
United States, quickly became a widespread global financial crisis (GFC) of a magnitude
never seen since the Great Depression in 1929. One striking phenomenon in this crisis
is that emerging market economies (EMEs) that seemed most vulnerable during the last
waves of financial crises in the 1990s fared much better than advanced economies.
First, emerging market economies fared better in terms of output losses. Figure 1
presents two crisis impact indicators1 in terms of real GDP losses in the G20 countries
(excluding the European Uinon). One can see that many EMEs, such as China, Indone-
sia, India and Argentina, suffered less output losses than developed industrial economies.
Moreover, Figure 2 shows that some EMEs, such as Argentina, Indonesia and Thailand,
which had experienced large currency depreciation in previous crisis periods, demon-
strated a remarkable exchange rate stability during the GFC2.
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Figure 1: Crisis impact indicators
Since 2009, an increasing number of papers started to look at the strengthened re-
silience of EMEs during the GFC and the underlying explanations3. Two noticeable
changes in EMEs have been particularly highlighted. First, they have accumulated mas-
sive foreign reserve assets between the early 2000s and the onset of the GFC. By examining
1Both indicators are calculated by Bussie`re et al. (2014). The detrended real GDP growth measures
the difference between the actual annual real GDP growth rate in 2009 and a six-year historical mean
before the crisis. The forecast errors capture the difference between the actual real GDP growth in 2009
and the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) forecast in the first quarter of 2008 (before the Lehman
collapse in September of the same year).
2In the case of Korea, although very volatile, the exchange rate depreciated less in the GFC than in
the Asian financial crisis.
3For a detailed review, please refer to Eichengreen (2010), Didier et al. (2012),
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), Ceballos et al. (2013), Catao and Milesi-Ferretti (2014), Obstfeld
(2013) and Bussie`re et al. (2014).
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Figure 2: Nominal exchange rate depreciation in times of crises: Using daily data, the series
are expressed in year-on-year growth rate (percentage point). A negative value indicates depreciation.
Time t indicates the date of crisis occurrence which is chosen according to Obstfeld (2013) and other
relevant literature on emerging market crises. Data source: DataStream, GTIS - FTID/TR
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Table 1: Reserve adequacy ratios
Country Reserves
GDP
, % Reserves
imports
, months Reserves
m2
, % Reserves
st.debt
, %
2000 2007 2000 2007 2000 2007 2000 2007
Argentina 8.84 17.02 9.11 10.04 27.77 55.92 64.97 406.38
Brazil 5.03 13.13 5.37 13.65 11.38 19.25 96.66 343.58
China 14.04 45.24 8.06 17.75 10.24 27.74 872.04 1270.63
India 8.21 24.25 6.22 11.47 15.14 29.73 423.01 344.19
Indonesia 17.22 12.72 6.11 6.02 36.51 31.38 141.84 192.61
Korea 18.02 24.98 5.98 7.19 29.43 41.31 293.39 206.73
Mexico 5.65 8.49 2.22 3.42 22.66 31.66 159.17 344.36
Russia 9.34 36.07 4.77 19.89 43.52 80.68 229.17 507.16
Saudi Arabia 10.38 79.3 4.44 25.23 23.32 144.08 191.36 1072.94
South Africa 4.57 10.35 2.21 3.62 9.23 12.07 54.81 195.82
Thailand 26.09 34.49 5.36 6.28 24.56 31.68 310.90 1012.25
Turkey 8.44 11.31 4.42 4.95 26.33 23.22 85.34 132.91
the conventional metrics4 of foreign reserve adequacy (see Table 1), one can easily see
that many EMEs have doubled or even tripled (e.g. Argentina and Thailand’s reserves
to short-term debt ratio) their reserve adequacy ratios from 2000 to 2007. At the same
time, EMEs seem to have slowly ‘[graduated] from fiscal procyclicality’ [Frankel et al.
(2013)] and have proactively used fiscal policy to stabilize their domestic economy during
the crisis period. According to Obstfeld (2013) it seems like these fast-growing economies
used the tranquil time after the emerging market crises of the 1990s to reform their policy
framework so that they have become more resilient to external shocks of the 21st century.
Based on these recent empirical observations, my work provides a simple theoretical
framework to understand the channels through which EMEs better protected themselves
against the GFC. The starting point of the story that I tell is the canonical Krugman
(1999) model, which attributes the main source of fragility in EMEs to balance sheet
effects implied by investors’ expectation on a country’s exchange rate. I am in fact
interested to show how holding international reserves can eliminate the bad equilibrium
associated with a negative perception on a country’s exchange rate. This is a relevant
question in the context of the GFC, as a gloomy world economic outlook may trigger
investors to downward adjust their expectations on a country’s exchange rate, especially
when this country has a large export sector and is more likely to be affected by the ‘global
trade collapse’ [Baldwin (2009)]. A negative perspective on a country’s currency would
then increase entrepreneurs’ financial burden of foreign debt repayment, lower their net
worth and even make them temporary insolvent. I argue in this paper that the government
can use foreign reserves to restore lenders’ confidence on the country’s currency. There
are, however, several ways regarding how reserves work to eliminate the unfavorable
equilibrium. One the one hand, the government can use its previously accumulated foreign
reserves as a targeted lending to the private sector; namely the government provides
foreign-currency lending when external funding is cut off. This is equivalent to give
lenders’ a government guarantee on the loans they grant to private entrepreneurs or
4There are four commonly used reserve adequacy metrics: reserves to GDP ratio, reserves to imports
ratio, reserves to M2 ratio [see Obstfeld et al. (2010)] and reserves to short-term debt ratio (Greenspan-
Guidotti’s rule).
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to let the government borrow abroad for the sake of the private sector. On the other
hand, the country’s authorities can also choose to stabilize domestic absorption via an
increase in government spending. This expansionary fiscal policy can be financed by
foreign reserves (expenditure switching policy) for example.
Comparing the targeted lending with fiscal spending, it is shown in this paper that
although both policies eliminate the bad equilibrium they work through two different
mechanisms. In the case of targeted lending, foreign reserves can be regarded as a state-
contingent insurance. Its value expressed in domestic terms increases with domestic
depreciation. The government’s commitment to lend strengthens lenders’ confidence on
domestic entrepreneurs’ wealth and thus sustains capital inflows in the domestic economy.
The bad equilibrium can thus be removed even without an actual depletion of reserves
as long as the stock of reserves in the economy is sufficient with respect to entrepreneurs’
foreign debt. However, a fiscal spending actually appreciates domestic real exchange rate
and raises entrepreneurs’ wealth as a result. This is achieved by an increase in demand
for domestic goods on the good market. The need for reserves depends on the magnitude
of domestic exchange rate depreciation.
This paper is closely related to three strands of literature: foreign reserve accumula-
tion, ‘third-generation’ crisis models and currency mismatch, as well as the countercyclical
fiscal policies in EMEs during the GFC.
As for the motives of foreign reserve accumulation, my work fits well in the works
on the precautionary motive of reserve holding5. In the literature, Jeanne and Rancie`re
(2011)6 studies how holding reserves can smooth domestic output or/and consumption
when the economy is hit by ‘sudden stops’. Bianchi et al. (2012) focus on how reserves
are needed when the government faces increasing costs of external financing or default
risks. In contrast, I rather study how reserves are useful in the context of currency
mismatches and the resultant balance sheet effects. In fact, reserves can not only be used
to provide foreign-currency liquidity in case of ‘sudden stops’ [Calvo (1998)], they can also
alter investors’ expectations on the net worth of a country’s private sector through the
exchange rate channel, thus insulating the domestic economy from balance sheet effects.
This is the focal point of my current work. After all, the last wave of emerging market
crises, especially in Asia, is largely explained by balance sheet effects and curiously, this
5For a detailed review of the precautionary motive for foreign reserve accumulation, see
Aizenman and Lee (2007), Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009), Aizenman and Hutchison (2012), Obstfeld et al.
(2010), Jeanne and Rancie`re (2011), Bianchi et al. (2012), Benigno and Fornaro (2012), Calvo et al.
(2013) and Bussie`re et al. (2014). There are additional approaches to study foreign reserve accumu-
lation: mercantilist approach [see Dooley et al. (2003), Korinek and Serven (2010) and Jeanne (2012)]
and structural approach [Dominguez (2010), Bacchetta et al. (2013) and Cheng (2014)].
6Based on a calibration using a sample of sudden stops in 34 middle-income countries over 1975-2003,
Jeanne and Rancie`re (2011) show that the negative impact of the financial account reversal on domestic
absorption can be offset by a depletion of reserves; a 10% fall in capital inflows leads to less than 3% of
GDP collapse if there is a buffer stock of reserves.
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aspect of the insurance role of reserves has not been thoroughly analyzed. My current
work can also be regarded as a theoretical underpinning to a few recent empirical papers7
that relate foreign reserve accumulation to (short-term) external debt ratio8. Moreover,
my work does not only focus on the motives of reserve accumulation, it also analyzes
and compares different ways of ‘using’ reserves. This is a new angle of studying foreign
reserves. I argue that depending on the policy tool used, foreign reserves need to be or
not to be actually depleted. This is related to the empirical finding of Bussie`re et al.
(2014) who document that reserves are rather ‘nuclear power’ than real ‘gunpowder’.
My current work is also closely related to the literature on the ‘third-generation’ crisis.
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, Krugman (1999) demonstrates that multiple
equilibria exist when the private sector in a country faces credit constraint (where the net
worth serves as collateral) and is exposed to large foreign-currency debt. While Krugman
(1999) aims at proving the existence of multiple equilibria, I propose concrete policy
choices to eliminate the bad one. Moreover, I add a government sector into Krugman
(1999)’s framework. By doing so, lenders’ expectation concerns not only entrepreneurs’
wealth but also the strength and the willingness of the government to stabilize domestic
economy. My paper is also inspired by Aghion et al. (2000) and Aghion et al. (2004) who
provide a micro-founded version of Krugman’s model. While these two papers focus on
how a monetary policy affects the multiple equilibria, I study the government’s targeted
lending in foreign currency and fiscal policies.
The currency mismatches are key for the balance sheet effect to work. In the scope
of this paper, I take currency mismatch as given. This is because my objective is to
illustrate how different public policies may be used to stabilize the domestic economy
rather than to explain why entrepreneurs want to hold foreign-currency liabilities ex ante.
There are nevertheless various well-founded motivations in the literature explaining the
demand for foreign-currency liabilities. Burnside et al. (1999) and Schneider and Tornell
(2004) argue that foreign-currency borrowing results from a risk-overtaking behavior of
domestic firms when they know that the government will bail out domestic banks in case
of default. Jeanne (2000) and Jeanne (2003) point to the signaling and commitment effect
of borrowing in foreign currency. Namely, by allowing the private sector to hold foreign
debt that is subject to exchange rate fluctuations, the government sends to the market
a signal about its commitment not to inflate the economy or depreciate the currency.
The need for foreign funding can also be explained by the fact that the domestic financial
market is underdeveloped; there is no sufficient domestic savings to be channeled to firms.
This is the assumption pointed out by Aghion et al. (2000) that I follow in my analysis.
7See Llaudes et al. (2010), Catao and Milesi-Ferretti (2014) and Bussie`re et al. (2014)
8In the case of emerging market economies, their short-term debts are mostly denominated in foreign
currency due to the ‘Original sin’ [Eichengreen et al. (2007)]
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Regarding how to reduce the impact of currency mismatches, Jeanne and Zettelmeyer
(2002) compare the pros and cons of using the monetary policy and different exchange
rate regimes. They conclude that monetary policy is contradictory in dealing with balance
sheet effects. With perfect capital mobility, the country where the private sector is hit by
negative expectations on the exchange rate should increase the interest rate to prevent
depreciation. However, a rise in interest rates is detrimental to domestic investment.
I explore in this paper a policy choice that has been mentioned but not analyzed in
Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2002): how fiscal policies can play a role when the monetary
policy is not effective in dealing with the multiple equilibria. Two different fiscal policy
tools - targeted lending or fiscal spending - are analyzed in the subsequent sections.
Jeanne and Wyplosz (2003) take a different angle to analyze how an international lender-
of-last-resort can be useful in dealing with the issue of currency mismatch. The GFC has
unfortunately demonstrated that international coordination for crisis management is far
from established nowadays. Many EMEs might prefer holding a buffer stock for self-
insurance instead of resort to the assistance of international financial institutions.
Finally, my paper is related to some recent empirical works on how EMEs used coun-
tercyclical fiscal policies to tackle the GFC. As Crowe et al. (2009), Eichengreen (2010)
and Didier et al. (2012) point out, fiscal policies in emerging market countries were used
to be procyclical in the past because EME business cycles tend to be driven by capi-
tal flows [see Kaminsky et al. (2005)]. This strand of literature has emphasized the role
of countercyclical fiscal policies to smooth domestic production. Following this litera-
ture, my model illustrates how countercyclical policies can help alleviate balance sheet
effects in the private sector. Prasad (2011), Didier et al. (2012) and Obstfeld (2013) ar-
gue that many EMEs have reduced their external debt denominated in foreign currency
and external financing there is oriented towards equity (which have advantages of be-
ing denominated in local currency and state-contingent) and foreign direct investment.
However, as Llaudes et al. (2010) point out, ‘large increases in reserves played a more
important role than any change in the currency denomination of external debt’ in re-
ducing a country’s exposure to external liabilities. The private sector might still have
net foreign liabilities in its balance sheet and is thus vulnerable to valuation losses in
case of domestic currency depreciation. Indeed, as Eichengreen (2010) states, ‘[w]hile
on-balance sheet foreign currency mismatches had been reduced, corporations [...] had
increased their off-balance sheet foreign currency exposure through derivative positions.’
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model setting. Section 3
derives and analyzes conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in absence of
government intervention. Section 4 introduces a government and studies its public policies
to stabilize the domestic private economy facing negative balance-sheet effects. Section 5
concludes.
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2 The model
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework showing the ways in
which foreign reserves are useful to stabilize the domestic economy exposed to external
financing strains. In the paper, I especially focus on the risks associated with currency
mismatches and the resultant balance sheet effects in the private sector. For this purpose,
the analysis in this paper is based on a stylized model with multiple equilibria similar to
Krugman (1999). Although very simple, it is enough to demonstrate the different ways
the government can stabilize the domestic economy using foreign reserves. The model
is based in a small-open real economy populated by a representative ‘hand-to-mouth’
worker and a representative firm9. A government will be introduced in Section 4 when I
analyze public policies.
2.1 Firm
The main actor in the decentralized economy is a representative firm. It uses labor
Nt and capital Kt to produce output Yt. The labor supply is ample and thus perfectly
inelastic, i.e. Nt = 1. Capital is chosen a period earlier through investment (It−1) and
fully depreciates every period, namely Kt = It−1. Capital is also supposed to be perfectly
mobile across borders. The production function is a standard neoclassical production
function. It is increasing in both inputs with decreasing marginal returns and homoge-
neous of degree one, namely Yt = F (Kt, Nt) = K
α
t N
1−α
t . α is the share of capital in the
production function.
Two important assumptions characterize the firm’s investment behavior. It faces
credit constraints on the one hand, and on the other hand it has foreign-good denominated
liabilities and thus is exposed to currency mismatches.
Regarding the credit constraint, the firm cannot borrow as much as they want; the
maximum borrowing capacity is limited by its net worth (Wt)
10. This is often the case
for firms, especially private firms, in emerging market economies. The credit constraint
assumption states that
Lt ≤ ψWt (1)
9In this paper I talk about balance sheet effects for a firm. But the analysis can also be applied to
banks exposed to foreign liabilities, such as in Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2002). There are no fundamental
differences between firms and banks regarding balance sheet effects.
10The credit constraint assumption derives directly from the literature on contract enforceability, such
as in Bernanke et al. (1999)
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where, Lt denotes borrowing made by the firm from the market. Wt denotes the firm’s
net worth. ψ is a parameter of the tightness of the credit market. The higher ψ11, the
higher leverage the firm has.
From here, we can derive the aggregate demand for investment of the representative
firm, which is composed of the firm’s net worth Wt and borrowed fund Lt:
It =Wt + Lt ≤ (1 + ψ)Wt (2)
The above demand function for investment (2) can be binding or unbinding depending
on the value of the collateral Wt and the tightness of credit constraints ψ. When this
constraint is binding, It = (1 + ψ)Wt. When the constraint is unbinding, It is strictly
lower than (1+ψ)Wt. In this case, It is pinned down by equalizing the marginal product of
capital and the marginal cost that is equal to the world interest rate as capital is perfectly
mobile. Namely, Fk(Kt+1, Nt+1) = Rt = R
∗, where Fk(·) denotes the marginal product
of capital, Rt and R
∗ are domestic and world interest rates respectively. Combining with
the functional form of the production function, one can derive It = I¯ =
(
α
R∗
) 1
1−α
when
the credit constraint is not binding.
Regarding the second assumption on foreign-good denominated liabilities, it is as-
sumed that the firm needs both foreign and domestic goods for investment12. In presence
of currency mismatches, the wealth function of the firm can be rewritten as follows:
Wt = αYt −Dt − ptD
∗
t (3)
The net worth of the firm Wt is equal to its capital income αYt minus the repayment
of domestic debt Dt and minus the repayment of foreign debt valuated at the current
exchange rate ptD
∗
t . Notice that D
∗
t is denominated in terms of foreign goods and pt is
the relative price of foreign goods in terms of domestic goods, thus the real exchange rate.
Dt and D
∗
t being predetermined at the beginning of period t, there is a linear relationship
between the firm’s net worth and the real exchange rate. This is the source of balance
11The value of ψ depends on the stage of financial development in a given country. ψ = 0 means that
no borrowing is possible. This can be the case in the least developed countries. In this extreme case, the
balance sheet effect is not at work as there is no foreign borrowing at all. In another extreme case, when
ψ = 1, there are no credit frictions. The firm’s wealth, thus balance sheet effects, will not play a crucial
role in determining overall investment in the economy. This is not an interesting case for the purpose of
this paper. Advanced economies, for instance, are supposed to have a very high ψ. The emerging market
economies (middle-income countries) that I will focus on in this paper should have a ψ in between the
two former cases and have a strong demand for foreign credit.
12This mixed nature of financing source can be explained by the underdevelopment of financial markets
in emerging market economies. Domestic funding is insufficient to sustain the demand for investment,
as Aghion et al. (2000) argue.
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sheet effects in the model.
Combining equations (2) and (3), the demand for investment of the firm is derived
below; it is a truncated function of the current real exchange rate pt.
It =


0 pt > p¯t
(1 + ψ)(αYt −Dt − p
e
tD
∗
t ) pt < pt < p¯t
I¯ =
(
α
R∗
) 1
1−α
pt < pt
(4)
p¯t =
αYt−Dt
D∗t
denotes the threshold value of the exchange rate beyond which the firm’s
wealth is reduced to zero or negative values. pt =
αYt−Dt−
I¯
1+ψ
D∗t
denotes the threshold
value of the exchange rate below which the firm’s wealth is high enough that the credit
constraint (1) no longer binds. Between pt and p¯t, the investment is a negative function
of the current exchange rate.
Table 2 provides comparative statics showing how the threshold values of the real
exchange rate change with the underlying macroeconomic variables.
2.2 Worker and domestic good market equilibrium
The role of the representative worker is minimized in the model as the focus of the
paper is on the link between exchange rate pressure and the balance sheet of the firm.
The worker provides the labor force to the firm and gets paid at the marginal product
of labor. The worker does not have access to financial markets so that he consumes all
his income every period (so called ‘hand-to-mouth’ labor). The worker consumes both
domestic goods, CHt , and foreign goods, C
F
t . As mentioned above, domestic goods serve
as the nume´raire with a unitary price and therefore the price of foreign goods in terms of
domestic goods, pt, denotes the real exchange rate. An increase in pt means a depreciation
of the price of the domestic goods (hereafter loosely speaking depreciation of the local
currency).
As in Krugman (1999), I assume that the elasticity of substitution between domestic
goods and foreign goods is one for both consumption and investment13. µ denotes the
Table 2: Comparative Statics
Y D D∗ ψ
p¯ ↑ ↓ ↓ /
p ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
13This assumption keeps the model tractable and allows a direct visual representation of the key
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share of the foreign-good component in total consumption Ct or total investment It.
Therefore, we have:
CHt = (1− µ)Ct
CFt =
µCt
pt
IHt = (1− µ)It
IFt =
µIt
pt
In the absence of a government, the aggregate demand for domestic goods, that
matches the total output produced by the domestic firm, is composed of the consump-
tion by the worker, the total investment denominated in domestic goods by the firm and
exports as stated in equation (5).
Yt = (1− µ)Ct + (1− µ)It + ptX
∗
t
= (1− µ)(1− α)Yt + (1− µ)It + ptX
∗
t
(5)
where, X∗t stands for exports denominated in foreign goods
14.
The good market equilibrium (5) pins down a linear relationship between the real
exchange rate and the level of total investment, as illustrated in equation (6). An increase
in total investment appreciates the domestic real exchange rate. This is because an
increase in total investment raises the demand for domestic goods. As the supply of
domestic goods is predetermined, an increase in the demand leads to a rise in the price
of domestic goods.
pt =
Yt[µ+ (1− µ)α]− (1− µ)It
X∗t
(6)
The basic features of the model being presented, let us look at how the model works
and generates balance sheet effects. The main trigger in the model is the expectation that
foreign creditors form about the real exchange rate in the domestic economy. Hereafter,
I add an superscript e when talking about expectations. As one can see in equations (4)
and (6), the expectation of the real exchange rate pet will affect the firm’s wealth Wt that
in turn will affect total investment It that ultimately determines the realization of the
real exchange rate pt.
Figure 3 summarizes the mechanism of the model. In fact, at the beginning of period
results. Loosening this assumption will not affect the qualitative results that this paper aims to provide.
14The value of domestic exports in terms of foreign goods, X∗t , is considered exogenous and fixed.
This is equivalent to assume that the foreign elasticity of substitution is unitary. Allowing the elasticity
of substitution to be bigger than one does not change the qualitative results presented in this paper. It
is easy to extend the current model to include a CES trade framework with monopolistic competition.
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t, foreign creditors form an expectation of the real exchange rate before making lending
decisions. An expected depreciation of the real exchange rate would lower the firm’s
expected wealth via higher repayment burden of foreign debt that has been granted to
the domestic firm a period earlier. Therefore, the borrowing capacity of the firm would
be lower as the collateral value for foreign creditors, which is a share of the expected
wealth of the firm, would be lower. Equation (4) thus pins down the total investment
needed in the economy based which foreign creditors would make their final lending
decisions. Capital inflows will ultimately pin down the real exchange rate on the good
market by equation (6) at the end of period t. In rational expectation equilibrium, the
actual realization of the exchange rate and investment coincide with the initial guesses.
As everything is in reality determined simultaneously within a period, from here and on
the time subscript is dropped.
Exp. exchange rate Expected wealthExp. debt burden
Realised exchange rate Exp. InvestmentCapital inflows
Figure 3: Model scheme
3 Multiple equilibria in a decentralized economy
This stylized model can be solved in an orthogonal plan of p(pe) and I(Ie) using two
equations (4) and (6).
First, equation (4) relates the expected exchange rate pet to the expected investment I
e
t .
This gives a truncated curve of the demand for investment (henceforth called II curve),
as Figure 4 shows.
When foreign creditors expect large depreciation, meaning that pe > p¯, the burden
of repaying foreign-good denominated debt becomes so heavy that the firm’s wealth is
driven to zero or beneath. In this case, no pledgeable income is available as collateral for
12
p(pe)
I(Ie)
p¯
p
I¯
II curveb
b
Figure 4: Demand for investment
foreign creditors. Therefore, rational creditors would never lend to the domestic economy.
Thus, I = Ie = 0. This scenario is represented by the red vertical segment on the y-axis.
When foreign creditors expect large appreciation, namely pe < p, the firm’s wealth
expressed in domestic good increases such that the credit constraint (2) never binds.
Domestic investment reaches the unbinding level: I¯ =
(
α
R∗
) 1
1−α
. This situation is repre-
sented by the red vertical segment at I = I¯ for all values of pe < p.
When p ≤ pe ≤ p¯, the demand curve of the investment is represented by a downward
sloping line.
Second, equation (6) gives an unambiguously negative relationship between I and
p. The realization of the domestic exchange rate is uniquely pinned down by the total
investment in the economy I, after foreign creditors have decided how much to lend.
The downward sloping line in Figure 5 (henceforth called the DD curve) represents this
relationship.
Under which conditions multiple equilibria exist? To understand that, let us combine
the II and DD curves in the (p(pe), I(Ie)) plan as shown in Figure 6.
Multiple equilibria are understood as the coexistence of a good equilibrium - appre-
ciated real exchange rate and high investment - and a bad equilibrium - depreciated real
exchange rate and low investment. There are two necessary conditions to guarantee the
existence of multiple equilibria. A bad equilibrium exists if p¯ ≤ [µ+(1−µ)α]Y
X∗
. Additionally,
a slop condition is needed to insure a good equilibrium exists: the DD curve needs to
have a steeper slope than the II curve when the credit constraint is binding15, namely
15Strictly speaking, there might be another possible equilibrium: when the DD curve is very steep,
it might intersect the x-axis before reaching the vertical segment I = I¯ (namely p < 0). This gives a
corner solution that is the intersection point between the DD curve and the x-axis. This is, however, not
13
Feasible set
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b
b
Figure 5: Aggregate resources
| − 1−µ
X∗
| ≥ | − 1
(1+ψ)D∗
|. Notice that the middle intersection point is unstable (see proof
in Appendix A).
Simplifying these two inequalities, one can deduce that as long as D
∗
X∗
≥
max
(
1
(1−µ)(1+ψ)
, α−d
µ+(1−µ)α
)
, there are multiple equilibria in the economy. It can be further
proved that for small values of µ, 1
(1−µ)(1+ψ)
is always bigger than α−d
µ+(1−µ)α
, namely the
slope condition dominates.
Using equations (4) and (6), one can calculate the bad and good equilibria:
Ibad = 0
pbad =
Y [µ+ (1− µ)α]
X∗
Igood = I¯ =
( α
R∗
) 1
1−α
pgood =
Y [µ+ (1− µ)α]− (1− µ)I¯
X∗
I will show in the next section to what extent appropriate public policies can eliminate
the bad equilibrium and stabilize the domestic economy, especially in the context of
unfavorable international economic environment.
4 Public policies
From this section, I introduce a benevolent government/central bank16 in the model
economy. Entering period t, the government has some previously accumulated resources,
an interesting solution (as the equilibrium exchange rate is equal to zero). For purposes of this paper, I
rule out this extreme case.
16The model economy is a real economy; one may think of the government in the model as the
consortium of a conventional government and a central bank. One may think that many central banks
in emerging market economies are not fully independent.
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Figure 6: Multiple equilibria
either in the form of foreign reserve assets B∗ or in the form of taxes T . The following
sections of the paper will focus on the government’s strategies of using its resources
to stabilize the domestic economy whenever it is necessary. For purposes of analysis,
resources are considered given and the ex ante costs of resource accumulation are thus
not taken into account.
To understand how the government can use foreign reserves to stabilize its domestic
economy, suppose we are in the context of the GFC. Lenders form a negative expectation
on exporting countries’ exchange rate due to a gloomy perspective on foreign demand
[e.g. a decrease in foreign demand X∗ due to the ‘global trade collapse Baldwin (2009)’].
Without any government intervention, a domestic depreciation is foreseeable through the
resource constraint (6).
The objective of the government is to eliminate the bad equilibrium associated with
a large currency depreciation and a very low level of investment. This requires altering
foreign creditors’ expectation on the domestic real exchange rate or intervening directly
on the exchange rate market, such that the firm’s wealth and borrowing capacity are not
tainted. Several ways of public intervention are analyzed and compared subsequently:
targeted lending in foreign goods by the government to the firm or an increase in public
spending (financed by taxes or foreign reserves).
4.1 Targeted lending to the private sector
In case where the government has previously accumulated foreign reserves, B∗, one
policy choice is to commit to lending directly foreign goods to the private sector whenever
the exchange rate is under pressure so as to insulate the firm’s net worth from potential
exchange rate depreciation. As a consequence, the potentially higher repayment of foreign
15
debt, due to potentially depreciated exchange rate, is offset by government lending in the
same currency. Under this view, foreign reserves can be regarded as a state-contingent
insurance, as its value increases with potential depreciation of the domestic exchange
rate. The policy can thus alter foreign creditors’ expectations on the firm’s net worth,
and sustain external financing even under unfavorable macroeconomic conditions. The
new wealth function of the firm is written in equation (7).
W e = αY −D − peD∗ + peB∗ (7)
This public lending policy is similar to the idea of setting an ‘international
banking fund’ which provides liquid foreign-good assets to ‘truly solvent banks’
[Jeanne and Wyplosz (2003)]. The difference here is that the targeted lending is pro-
vided by a national government17. As long as foreign reserves cover the foreign liabilities
in the domestic economy, there will be a full insurance.
The aggregate resource function (5) that determines the actual level of exchange rate
does not change, as nothing changes the demand for domestic goods. As a result, the
DD curve remains the same while the II curve shifts upward (with the unbinding level
of demand for investment I¯ unchanged. The latter only depends on the international
interest rate). Figure 7 shows the new equilibrium and compares it with the multiple
equilibria in a decentralized economy.
Figure 7 clearly shows that when the government lends foreign goods to the private sec-
tor, it eliminates the bad equilibrium (0, pbad). With the firm’s new wealth equation (7),
the slope of the II curve becomes steeper. The new threshold value of the real exchange
rate beyond which the firm’s wealth is driven to zero or beneath, p¯
′
, is raised, making it
less likely to happen. The bad equilibrium is removed as long as 0 < pbad ≤ p¯
′
= αY−D
D∗−B∗
with B∗ < D∗. This gives:
D∗ −
α− d
µ+ (1− µ)α
X∗ ≤ B∗ < D∗ (8)
Notice that the good equilibrium remains the same as in the decentralized market
equilibrium. This is because the government’s commitment to lend in foreign goods
only aims at altering foreign creditors’ expectation on the domestic real exchange rate.
As long as the commitment is credible (i.e. backed by sufficient foreign reserves), the
17Clearly, the ‘international banking fund’ has never be founded since Jeanne and Wyplosz’s paper
in 2003. One argument in my model in favor of holding international reserves at the national level is
that the stock of reserves gives a positive signal to the market on the economy’s financial capacity to
conduct appropriate policies in the times of crises. Moreover, national authorities should know better
their domestic private institutions and can be more easily to select ‘truly solvent’ banks or firms to which
the lending in foreign goods should be granted.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium with targeted lending
government does not even need to actually deplete its foreign reserves to stabilize the
domestic economy.
From equation (8), the minimum level of reserves needed for targeted lending is equal
to B∗lendmin = D
∗ − α−d
µ+(1−µ)α
X∗. As long as the first condition for the existence of multiple
equilibria holds, one can prove that B∗lendmin is larger than zero. Namely, when the foreign-
good income from exports cannot cover foreign liabilities, reserves are needed to make
sure that the expected wealth of the firm is above zero.
The amount of reserves needed 18 depends on the private sector’s exposure to foreign-
good debt (D∗). The higher foreign debt, the more reserves are needed for targeted
lending policy. It is negatively correlated with foreign-good income earned through ex-
ports X∗. If at time t, the flow of exports (augmented by a coefficient) exceeds that
of foreign liabilities, B∗ might become negative, namely there is an accumulation of re-
serves. The amount of reserves for targeted lending policy also depends on the marginal
propensity to imports µ and the per GDP domestic lending ratio d. The higher µ, the
more foreign goods are demanded, thus higher reserves are needed to pay out imported
goods.
Notice that the targeted lending policy is equivalent to the situation where the gov-
ernment uses its own net worth WG as a collateral to secure external funding for the
sake of the domestic firm. In the model, the government’s net worth comes from its for-
eign reserve holding valued at the current real exchange rate, namely, WG = peB∗. The
18This is a flow variable which refers to the amount of reserves required to conduct a certain public
policy. This is different from the stock of reserves which is a stock variable.
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government’s net worth moves in the opposite direction compared to that of the firm.
An expected depreciation of the real exchange rate would increase the government’s net
worth and reduce that of the firm. Therefore, while the firm has difficulties to sustain
external financing facing an adverse shock on the real exchange rate, the government can
serve as a financial intermediary. In this case, the investment function (2) becomes:
Ie ≤ (1 + ψ)(W e +WG)
= (1 + ψ)(αY −D − peD∗ + peB∗)
where the second parenthesis is exactly the same as in equation (7), in the case of a
targeted lending policy.
In reality, during the GFC, some emerging economies that were seriously hit by bal-
ance sheet effects during the last wave of emerging market crises experienced rather an
exchange rate stability. This is the case in Thailand for example (see Figure 2). Obstfeld
(2013) attributes this exchange rate stability to the ample level of reserves in Thailand
compared to its external debt. In the case of Korea, albeit a large absolute level of reserves
(sixth largest reserve holder), its reserves to short-term debt ratio is less impressive in
comparison with other EMEs (see Table 1). If reserves are scaled by total external debt of
different maturities, they can only cover 70% of the entire exposure of the Korean private
sector to foreign-currency debt [Cho (2012)]. According to Cho, the Korean government
depleted its foreign reserves to supply foreign currency liquidity required to reduce the
accumulated leverage in the private banking sector; ‘[i]t was not a sheer coincidence that
the amount of decrease in foreign reserves during the crisis period from September to
December 2008, approximately US$40 billion, was almost the same as that of short-term
foreign debts [Cho (2012)].’ Based on the implications of the current model, the market
may think Korea did not hold enough foreign reserves to rule out the bad equilibrium.
As a result one observes in Figure 2 that the exchange rate of Korean won was still very
volatile during the GFC compared to other EMEs’ currencies.
4.2 Expansionary fiscal policy
The second policy choice of the government is to conduct an expenditure-switching
policy to increase public spending on domestic goods. Bearing in mind that in the frame-
work of Krugman (1999), a fiscal spending should not be understood in the Keynesian
sense, as prices are fully flexible in this stylized model and the supply of domestic goods is
predetermined at the beginning of each period. Therefore, an expansionary fiscal policy
in period t raises domestic demand and appreciates the domestic exchange rate.
Different from the targeted lending policy, a fiscal spending actually affects the ex-
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change rate through the aggregate resource constraint. Suppose the fiscal spending is fi-
nanced by previously accumulated foreign reserves, the aggregate resource constraint (5)
becomes:
Y = (1− µ)(1− α)Y + (1− µ)I +G+ pX∗
G = pB∗
(9)
And the real exchange rate is pinned down: p = Y [µ+(1−µ)α]−(1−µ)I
X∗+B∗
.
The DD curves is rotated downwards around the point
(
(α+ µ
1−µ
)Y, 0
)
. The II curve
remains unchanged as in the decentralized economy.
Figure 8 shows the new equilibrium and compares it with the multiple equilibria in
the decentralized economy. It can be seen that a fiscal spending financed by previously
accumulated reserves can also eliminate the bad equilibrium (0, pbad). However, the good
equilibrium in this case also changes. In fact, although the realized investment achieves
the same unbinding level I¯, the exchange rate is appreciated to pgood
′
, with pgood
′
< pgood.
This is because a fiscal spending changes immediately the demand for domestic goods
and determines consequently a new level of exchange rate through the new aggregate
resource constraint (9). Foreign reserves are depleted in this case.
The bad equilibrium is eliminated in this policy setting as long as p
′
is smaller than
p¯ (see Figure 8). Namely, 0 < p
′
= Y [µ+(1−µ)α]
X∗+B∗
≤ p¯ = αY−D
D∗
. This gives:
D∗
[µ+ (1− µ)α]
α− d
−X∗ ≤ B∗ (10)
The minimum level of reserves needed to conduct an expansionary fiscal policy is:
B∗fiscmin = D
∗ [µ+(1−µ)α]
α−d
−X∗. The condition 1 for the existence of multiple equilibria also
guarantees that B∗fisc > 0.
One may argue that government spending is usually financed by domestic taxes in-
stead of foreign reserves. Suppose now that fiscal spending is financed by previously
collected taxes. In this case, government resources are denominated in domestic goods
only. The new aggregate resource constraint becomes:
Y = (1− µ)(1− α)Y + (1− µ)I +G+ pX∗
G = T
(11)
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Figure 8: Equilibrium with fiscal spending financed by reserves
Equation (11) determines the exchange rate: p = Y [µ+(1−µ)α]−T−(1−µ)I
X∗
. This time,
the DD curve (black line in Figure 9) is shifting downwards, parallel to the DD curve
in the decentralized economy (dashed blue line). The II curve remains unchanged. As
one can see from Figure 9, the bad equilibrium can also be eliminated, but the exchange
rate needs to be more largely appreciated in the good equilibrium than in the case where
fiscal spending is financed by foreign reserves.
The condition for removing the bad equilibrium requires: p
′′
= Y [µ+(1−µ)α]−T
X∗
≤ p¯ =
αY−D
D∗
. This gives a criterion for the minimum taxes that the governments needs to
stabilize the domestic economy:
Y [µ+ (1− µ)α]−
(αY −D)X∗
D∗
≤ T (12)
.
Namely, the minimum amount of taxes needed to eliminate the bad equilibrium is
Tmin = Y [µ+ (1− µ)α]−
(αY−D)X∗
D∗
.
One counterfactual question that can be naturally asked is: if the public spending
financed by taxes achieved the same equilibrium as in the case where fiscal spending is
financed by foreign reserves, could the bad equilibrium still be removed? This situation is
represented by the black line in Figure 10. It can be proved that a fiscal spending financed
by taxes cannot unambiguously remove the bad equilibrium. The minimum taxes that
help the economy achieve the same good equilibrium as in the case of a fiscal spending
financed by foreign reserves are smaller than Tmin
19.
19It can be shown that the minimum taxes requested to achieve the same good equilibrium as in the
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Figure 9: Equilibrium with fiscal spending financed by taxes
The difference between these two ways to finance fiscal expansion is grounded in the
fact that using reserves not only raises the demand for domestic goods but also implies
an exchange rate intervention by converting foreign goods to domestic goods. Therefore,
it is easier to remove the bad equilibrium by using foreign reserves. There are concrete
examples where countries use foreign reserves for fiscal expansion. China, for instance,
used US$67.5 billion from its foreign reserve holding to recapitalize four state-owned
banks in 2003. Similarly, in 2007, US$200 billion were deplete to fund China Investment
Corporation.
4.3 Differences between targeted lending and fiscal spending
A targeted lending policy and a public spending policy, although both can remove
the bad equilibrium, work through two different mechanisms. They also differ in terms
of the minimum amount of resources required. I discuss these differences in this section.
First, a targeted lending policy can be at work through lenders’ expectation while
a fiscal spending truly changes the demand for domestic goods and appreciates the real
exchange rate. In fact, the targeted lending policy affects the firm’s wealth function
through expectations. As one can see in Figure 7, the government’s commitment to lend
in foreign goods increases the threshold exchange rate for which the firm’s wealth falls
beneath zero (p¯
′
> p¯). Similarly, this policy makes it easier for the credit constraint not to
case of a fiscal spending financed by foreign reserves are equal to pgood
′
B
∗fisc
min (see Figure 10). p
good′
is determined by plugging the unbinding level of investment I¯ into equation (9). One can then easily
demonstrate that pgood
′
B
∗fisc
min < Tmin.
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Figure 10: Fiscal spending: equivalence
bind (p
′
> p). As a result, foreign creditors will believe that the firm’s wealth will remain
positive for a wider range of values of the expected exchange rate. Therefore, lenders will
be willing to provide funding to this economy. With the targeted lending, the government
only needs to hold sufficient foreign reserves to cover the private sector’s foreign liabilities
so as to eliminate the bad equilibrium. Foreign reserves will only be deployed if the
expected depreciation materializes (e.g. a realized shock on foreign demand X∗).
This theoretical result is in line with the empirical literature on the role of foreign
reserves in the GFC. Bussie`re et al. (2014) find that the pre-crisis reserves to short-
term debt ratio is the most significant reserve adequacy ratio when assessing the impact
of holding reserves on the real GDP growth across different emerging and developing
economies during the GFC. Moreover, their paper finds that it is rather the existence of
foreign reserves that matters than the active use.
As for fiscal spending, the mechanism is different. An increase in government spending
will unambiguously change the exchange rate through the aggregate demand for domestic
goods. To insure the same amount of investment, the government needs to appreciate
the price of domestic goods by increasing government consumption so as to maintain
the firm’s wealth. If the insurance provided by a targeted lending policy works through
the firm’s wealth directly, fiscal spending affects the level of domestic exchange rate and
affects the firm’s wealth only indirectly. I have also shown that the financing sources
of fiscal spending matter. For the same amount of resources, a fiscal spending financed
by foreign reserves can eliminate the bad equilibrium more easily than a fiscal spending
financed by taxes. More resources are need in the latter case.
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I compare now the minimum levels of reserves needed to implement the targeted
lending or fiscal spending financed by reserves. In fact, accumulating foreign reserves is
not costless, the less reserves needed to achieve the same policy objective the better.
Let us denote Γ = B∗lendmin − B
∗fisc
min .
Γ = D∗ −
(α− d)X∗
µ+ (1− µ)α
− [D∗
[µ+ (1− µ)α]
α− d
−X∗]
=
[
d+ (1− α)µ
][ X∗
µ+ (1− µ)α
−
D∗
α− d
]
= −
[
d+ (1− α)µ
]
X∗
1
α− d
[D∗
X∗
−
α− d
µ+ (1− µ)α
]
Γ < 0 unambiguously as long as there are multiple equilibria, namely D
∗
X∗
≥
max
(
1
(1−µ)(1+ψ)
, α−d
µ+(1−µ)α
)
.
As a result, B∗fiscmin > B
∗lend
min . This means that an increase in government spending
requires a higher level of reserves than the direct lending policy in foreign goods. The
reason behind is that the lending policy can be regarded as a direct write-off of the private
sector’s foreign-good debt or an official government guarantee on the private sector’s
debt. The need in terms of foreign goods is capped by the total amount of external debt
facing the economy. However, for an expansionary fiscal policy to stabilize the domestic
exchange rate, the amount of foreign reserves that the government needs to sell and with
which it buys domestic goods depends on the magnitude of the depreciation. The more
severe the depreciation, the more reserves are needed. Therefore, in terms of the level of
reserves needed, targeted lending uses less resources than expansionary fiscal policy.
5 Conclusion
This work provides a simple theoretical framework to study different mechanisms
through which foreign reserves can be useful in an economy where the private sector
faces credit constraints and currency mismatches. It is shown that foreign reserves can
be considered as a state-contingent insurance when the exchange rate valuation effect is
taken into account. This is an aspect that has not yet been emphasized in the literature
on foreign reserves. In fact, when there is a negative shock or a negative expectation on
a country’s currency, the domestic value of foreign reserves increases such that they can
be used to stabilize the domestic economy, either through a targeted lending to the pri-
vate sector or through an expansionary fiscal policy. The former channel works through
investors’ expectation and requires less foreign reserves than in the second case. The
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underlying reason is that a targeted lending is equivalent to giving investors a govern-
mental guarantee on the private sector’s liabilities (especially foreign liabilities). Having
sufficient foreign reserves alters investors’ expectation and removes the bad equilibrium.
The current framework remains simple. A more comprehensive theoretical framework
is needed to endogenize the firm’s portfolio choice and different costs related to ex ante
foreign reserve purchases.
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A Unstable middle intersection point
Based on Figure 11, I show here that the middle intersection point (point A) between
the DD and II curves is unstable. There are only two stable multiple equilibria: good
equilibrium (G) and bad equilibrium (B).
Proof. Suppose the lenders form an expectation at time t which locates at the point
A− on the II curve. The expected investment at the point A− will then determine the
exchange rate through the aggregate resource constraint, namely the DD curve. The
economy goes from point A− to A−
′
. Given the new exchange rate at point A−
′
, lenders
will adjust their investment. The economy goes from A−
′
to A−
′′
. Again, the adjusted
investment determines the exchange rate using the DD curve. This pushes the stable
equilibrium to the B point (bad equilibrium). The same logic chain applies when the
economy starts at the point A+
p(pe)
I(Ie)
b
b
b
b
b G
B
A
A+A
−
A−
′
A−
′′
Figure 11: Unstable middle point
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